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Abstract 
This study examines the informational content of options trading on acquirer announcement 
returns. We show that implied volatility spread predicts positively on the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR), and implied volatility skew predicts negatively on the CAR. The predictability is 
much stronger around actual merger and acquisition (M&A) announcement days, compared with 
pseudo-event days. The prediction is weaker if pre-M&A stock price has incorporated part of the 
information, but stronger if acquirer’s options trading is more liquid. Finally, we find that higher 
relative trading volume of options to stock predicts higher absolute CARs. The relation also 
exists among the target firms.  
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I. Introduction 
The theoretical literature in options argues that informed traders prefer to trade options rather 
than stocks due to lower trading costs (or higher leverage) and more efficient trading (Back, 
1993; Cao, 1999; Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas, 1998). Empirical research supports the notion 
that options trades convey information about future stock prices. For example, Easley et al. 
(1998) argue that informed traders may prefer the options market when its implicit leverage is 
high and its trading is more liquid. Pan and Poteshman (2006) find that stocks with low put–call 
ratios, based on options trades that open new options positions, outperform stocks with high put–
call ratios by more than 1% in the following week. Recent studies also support the existence of 
informed trading in the options market (e.g., Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010; Johnson and So, 
2012; Lin, Lu, and Driessen, 2013; Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2010; Xing, Zhang, and 
Zhao, 2010). 
However, another strand of research shows that options trading does not contribute to 
price discovery for the underlying stock. Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) find that options trading 
volume has no incremental predictive ability after controlling for stock trading volume. Instead, 
new information in the options market comes in the form of quote revisions rather than trades. 
Recently, Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2013) show that even options price quotes do not 
contain economically significant information that has not been reflected in the stock price quotes. 
These results seem to suggest that options trading does not provide information to predict future 
stock price changes.  
Our study sheds light on this debate by focusing on the most important corporate events, 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and by examining whether informed traders indeed capitalize 
on their private information about the events by trading options. An advantage of examining 
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M&A events is that they are in most cases not known to the general public except for few 
informed traders. As a result, the stock price prior to M&A may not incorporate information 
regarding the forthcoming M&A. We hypothesize that options trading contains private 
information of M&A transactions and thus can be used to predict M&A announcement returns of 
acquirers. Specifically, we argue that when some informed traders possess favorable 
(unfavorable) information that will be reflected subsequently in the stock market around the 
M&A announcement, they will buy more calls (puts) in advance to make profits.
5
  
We adopt two informed options trading measures, implied volatility (IV) spread as in 
Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) and IV skew as in Xing et al. (2010), to test their predictability 
on acquirer announcement returns. We provide supporting evidence by answering the following 
three questions: Is the predictability stronger around the event days than on other days? Does the 
predictability get smaller when the information regarding the M&A has been reflected in the 
stock price before the announcement? Is the predictability positively associated with the liquidity 
of options trading as argued by Easley et al. (1998)?  
Empirically, our sample covers M&A events from the Securities Data Company (SDC) 
Platinum database for the period of 1996 to 2010. For each acquirer, we obtain the daily options 
data from OptionMetrics to construct our proxies for informed options trading. The IV spread 
measures the average difference in implied volatilities between call and put options on the same 
security with the same strike price and maturity. Intuitively, a larger IV spread means that calls 
                                                          
5
 Although the literature finds that the average acquirer announcement return is close to zero, 
large variation exists among M&A announcement returns. Informed traders can still make profits 
by buying calls or puts before events with non-zero returns. 
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are more expensive than puts, indicating a higher buying pressure on call options.
6
 The IV skew 
measures the difference in implied volatilities between out-of-the-money (OTM) put and at-the-
money (ATM) call. A higher IV skew indicates that investors have a higher demand on OTM 
puts, suggesting a possible drop in the future stock price.
7
  
Using the two informed options trading measures at one day before M&A 
announcements, we find that a higher IV spread predicts a higher acquirer cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) over the two-day (0, +1) window and that a higher IV skew predicts a lower two-
day acquirer CAR. In particular, when we run regressions of CARs on IV spread and IV skew, 
the coefficient for IV spread (IV skew) is 13.85 (–9.51) with a t-statistic of 4.03 (–2.58) after 
controlling for a variety of firm- and deal-specific characteristics. Both results are consistent with 
our main hypothesis.  
We conduct several additional tests to substantiate the main hypothesis. First, we show 
that IV spread and IV skew have a much stronger predictability on the event dates (i.e., M&A 
announcements) compared with nonevent dates in simulations. Second, we find that pre-M&A 
stock market response, measured by the three-day CAR immediately before M&A 
announcements, affects the predictability of informed options trading measures. Third, we find 
that the predictive power of informed options trading measures is stronger if the acquirer’s 
options liquidity (measured by the bid–ask spread) is higher.  
                                                          
6
 For studies adopting IV spread, see, among others, Bali and Hovakimian (2009), Jin, Livnat, 
and Zhang (2012), and Lin et al. (2013). 
7
 For studies adopting IV skew (or IV smirk), see, among others, Bester, Martinez, and Rosu 
(2011), Bollen and Whaley (2004), Jin et al. (2012), Lin et al. (2013), and Van Buskirk (2011). 
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We also adopt options to stock volume ratio (O/S), based on the unsigned volume of 
options trading relative to the trading of corresponding stock, as an alternative measure of 
informed options trading.
8
 Furthermore, our results are robust to several alternative definitions of 
informed options trading measures, such as deciles of IV spread or IV skew and changes in IV 
spread or IV skew relative to the previous week or previous month. Excluding events with small 
deal value or small market capitalization does not alter our findings. Finally, we find consistent 
evidence of IV spread and IV skew in predicting the announcement CARs of target firms.  
Our study contributes to the literature by linking informed options trading to acquirer 
announcement returns. Existing studies (e.g., Cao, Chen, and Griffin, 2005; Arnold, Erwin, Nail, 
and Nixon, 2006) mainly focus on target firms and find some evidence of informed options 
trading before the announcements. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to examine 
the return predictability of informed options trading on acquiring firms. We focus on acquiring 
firms for several reasons.  
First, target firms tend to be private, small, and without listed options. By focusing on 
acquiring firms, we are able to utilize a comprehensive sample of public and relatively larger 
firms up to date. Even among those target firms with listed options, the liquidity of options may 
be too low for informed traders to make a profit. The bid–ask spread can widen dramatically 
when very few contracts are traded. In contrast, acquiring firms tend to be larger with higher 
options liquidity and thus are more attractive to the informed traders.  
Second, because the distribution of acquirer announcement returns is quite dispersed, 
with an average value close to zero, a good return prediction is difficult. Informed investors can 
                                                          
8
 For more discussion on O/S, see Johnson and So (2012) and Roll et al. (2010). 
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profit on trading acquirer options only if they possess private information regarding M&A 
announcements. The excess demand pressure on calls (puts) due to informed traders capitalizing 
on their positive (negative) private news on forthcoming M&A events can push up the IV spread 
(skew). In other words, the cross-sectional variation of announcement CAR is partially captured 
by the variation of IV spread and IV skew before the event. Conversely, the target announcement 
returns tend to be positive given the large premium in a typical takeover. Even when informed 
traders only know about the announcement dates but not the detailed contents, the high chance of 
positive announcement returns of target firms can still lead to high options trading. As a result, 
we argue that the examination of acquirers offers a stronger test on informed trading in the 
options market as informed traders need to know how stock market may respond to the 
announcements.   
Finally, debate exists on whether acquisitions create value for shareholders of acquiring 
firms (Fuller et al., 2002; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Moeller et al., 2005). Prior research shows 
that takeover announcements can be good or bad news for acquirers depending on firm- and 
deal-specific characteristics. For example, an acquisition may benefit the acquirer when financed 
by cash or debt or when the target firm is in the same industry (see, e.g., Graham, Lemmon, and 
Wolf, 2002; Hazelkorn, Zenner, and Shivdasani, 2004; Mara, McConnell, and Stolin, 2006; 
Savor and Lu, 2009). We offer a simple approach to evaluate acquisitions by examining 
informed trading in the options market and thus shed light on the debate in the M&A literature.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our M&A 
sample and the two main options measures we use. Section III presents the main hypothesis and 
results. Section IV offers additional supporting evidence. We test our main hypothesis on target 
firms in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper. 
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II. Data  
A. M&A sample 
Our M&A sample is from Securities Data Company (SDC) platinum database and covers the 
period of January 1996 to December 2010. Daily options data are from OptionMetrics. We 
require the acquiring firms be listed in NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with daily stock returns in 
CRSP and annual accounting information in COMPUSTAT. To examine the predictability of 
pre-event informed options trading, we keep only firms which have available daily options 
trading prior to their M&A announcements. We restrict our sample to transactions classified as 
“merger” or “acquisition of a majority interest” because they are most relevant to our study and 
contain relatively more transactions. We exclude cases in which the same acquirer announces a 
merger with several different target firms on the same day because the acquirer return is affected 
by several announcements simultaneously. On the several occasions in which the acquirer has 
multiple stocks listed in the exchange, we keep the one with the highest stock trading volume on 
the day before the M&A announcement. Our final sample consists of 7,047 merger cases by 
2,439 acquiring firms. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the sample distribution by event years. Several acquirers 
conduct more than one M&A in a year. Consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Moeller et 
al., 2004, 2005), relatively more events occurred in late 1990s. Panel B lists the summary 
statistics of acquirers’ firm characteristics. The CAR is calculated by cumulating the abnormal 
returns from day t to t+1, where day t is the M&A announcement date, or the first trading day 
after announcement if the announcement date is a nontrading day. We use CRSP value-weighted 
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market return as the benchmark in estimating daily abnormal returns. The mean acquirer CAR is 
–0.10% with a standard deviation of 6.52%.9  
[Table 1 about here] 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Harford, Jenter, and Li, 2011), the mean acquirer CAR 
is slightly negative and close to zero. If we classify M&A events by their primary payment 
method, we find that the mean announcement return for cases with cash payment is much higher 
than that for events with stock payment. This result is consistent with the previous research (e.g., 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki, 2011).  
In Panel B of Table 1, options bid–ask spread is the pre-M&A five-day average bid–ask 
spread across all options traded on the firm's equity. The level of options bid–ask spread of 
acquirers is lower than that of targets, which is listed in Panel B of Appendix Table 2. In general, 
acquirers have high liquidity in options than targets do. This result is consistent with our 
conjecture that options trading on acquirers may contain more information due to higher liquidity. 
Accordingly, we expect to see a stronger result of our informed options trading proxies on 
acquirer announcement returns. 
Analyst coverage equals the number of IBES analyst recommendations in the month 
before M&A. Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization on the day before M&A 
announcement. Age is the number of years that a stock has been covered in CRSP before the 
M&A announcement. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals from the 
                                                          
9
 In Appendix Figure 1, we plot the daily equal-weighted and value-weighted abnormal stock 
returns for acquirers from t–30 to t+30. Our result suggests that acquirer returns are quite volatile 
even in the normal period. 
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Fama–French three-factor model with daily returns in the pre-M&A 12 months. Comparing with 
the statistics in Panel B of Appendix Table 2, acquirers have higher analyst coverage, larger size, 
older age, and slightly lower idiosyncratic volatility than targets.  
 
B. IV spread  
To examine the informational content of options trading, we make use of two options measures 
newly adopted in the recent literature. The first is IV spread, which is regarded as a proxy for 
price pressure in the options market (Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010). Based on deviations from 
the put–call parity, IV spread is constructed as the average difference in implied volatilities 
between call options and put options for the same underlying security with the same strike price 
and the same maturity.
10
 In particular, we compute IV spread for each firm i on each day t as  
                                                          
10
 One concern for the implied volatility is that the stock price process around M&A events is 
best described by a jump process while the implied volatility is computed based on the Black–
Scholes model. We argue that the implied volatility is a one-on-one monotonic transformation 
from options price to implied volatility. Therefore, as long as the options price has incorporated 
the jump effect, the implied volatility would be able to reflect the jump partially. We could use 
the options price directly to construct the informed options trading measures. However, we have 
to adjust for the impact of some options characteristics on prices such as moneyness. Using 
implied volatility is a convenient way to compare options prices across different strike prices. 
We acknowledge that the calculation of the Black–Scholes implied volatility assumes a constant 
stock-return volatility. However, the concern can be mitigated by the fact that we do not use the 
level of implied volatility directly as our IV spread or IV skew is the difference in implied 
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See Appendix for a detailed explanation of the construction procedure. 
Table 2, Panel A, summarizes the IV spread by year. In general, IV spread is negative, 
with a mean of –0.0093 and a standard deviation of 0.0505. As a signed measure of informed 
options trading activity, IV spread can predict both positive and negative future abnormal returns. 
Intuitively, if call options are more expensive than put options, the implied volatilities of calls 
will be higher than those of puts, leading to a positive IV spread. A larger (especially increasing) 
IV spread means that investors demand more call options, expecting a positive abnormal return 
on the underlying stock.
11
 Conversely, a smaller (especially decreasing) IV spread is associated 
with a negative future abnormal stock return. Therefore, if investors in the options market hold 
private information on an M&A event, we expect the pre-event IV spread to be positively 
associated with the announcement return.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
C. IV skew 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
volatilities between call options and put options. If the biases for the call implied volatility and 
put implied volatility due to this jump issue are of similar magnitude, the biases would be largely 
cancelled out. We thank the referee for pointing out this issue. 
11
 Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) argue that short sale constraints cannot explain the positive 
relation between IV spread and abnormal stock returns. 
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The other options measure that we adopt is IV skew, a proxy for negative price pressure in the 
options market (Xing, Zhang, and Zhao, 2010). We calculate daily IV skew for firm i on day t by 
the implied volatility difference between the out-of-the-money (OTM) put and the at-the-money 
(ATM) call as  
, , ,(2) .
OTMput ATMcall
i t i t i tIV Skew IV IV   
See Appendix for a detailed explanation of the construction procedure. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows that IV skew is generally positive, with a mean of 0.0432 and a 
standard deviation of 0.0527. IV skew is also a signed measure on informed options trading. If 
investors hold negative information, they tend to buy put options, especially the OTM puts, 
either to hedge against future price drop or to speculate on the potential return by buying put 
options. If more investors are willing to buy OTM puts, the stock prices and implied volatilities 
of OTM puts will be pushed up, and IV skew will increase. Therefore, a higher demand for OTM 
put options indicates that investors hold negative news on the firm and expect a lower stock 
return in near future. ATM call is used as the benchmark because it is the most liquid option and 
thus can reflect investors’ consensus about the uncertainty of the firm. The rationale of IV skew 
is consistent with the implied volatility functions measured by delta in Bollen and Whaley (2004). 
Thus in M&A events we expect a negative relation between pre-announcement IV skew and the 
announcement return.   
 
III. Main hypothesis and results 
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This section discusses our main hypothesis that options trading prior to an M&A event contains 
information on acquirer announcement returns. As previously discussed, we use two signed 
measures of informed options trading, IV spread and IV skew, to test whether they can predict 
acquirer announcement CARs.  
 
A. Acquirer announcement CARs sorted by IV spread and IV skew 
To show the relation between announcement returns and informed options trading measures, we 
sort the sample into quintiles based on pre-announcement IV spread and IV skew, respectively. 
We expect that the acquirer announcement return will increase with the value of IV spread and 
decrease with the value of IV skew.  
Table 3 shows the mean and t-statistics of acquirer CARs for each quintile of IV spread 
or IV skew. CARs are cumulated from day t to t+1 where day t is the announcement date or the 
first trading day after the announcement if that day is a nontrading day. We use the day t–1 value 
of IV spread and IV skew because the informational advantage of informed traders should be 
largest right before corporate events, as argued by Skinner (1997). Consistent with our 
expectation, mean CAR is generally increasing with IV spread. The difference in CAR between 
the two extreme quintiles is significant and positive, with a mean of 1.67% and a t-statistic of 
4.11. However, CAR is decreasing with IV skew in a monotonic pattern. High-minus-low 
difference equals –1.02% with a t-statistic of –1.96. For robustness, we also show the median 
CAR for each quintile. The results are very similar to the mean values. 
[Table 3 about here] 
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From the one-way sort analysis, we obtain preliminary supporting evidence for our main 
hypothesis. The acquirer announcement return is positively correlated with IV spread and 
negatively correlated with IV skew. In the next subsection, we present cross-sectional 
regressions to further support our hypothesis. 
 
B. Higher IV spread or lower IV skew is associated with higher acquirer announcement CAR 
We argue that a high IV spread (IV skew) reflects investors’ expectation of a future upward 
(downward) price movement around the announcements. We formalize this expectation by 
running cross-sectional regressions of acquirer announcement returns on informed options 
trading measures and control variables. The main regression model is specified as  
,[ , 1] 0, 1, , 1 , 1
1, ,[ 22, 1] 2, ,[ 252, 23]
3, , 4, , 5, , 6, . 7, .
8,
(3) ( )
Pre-month Return Pre-year Return
i t t i i i t i t
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 
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where CARi, [t, t+1] is the two-day cumulative abnormal return around the M&A announcement 
date t for each acquiring firm i, expressed in percentage. The independent variables of interest 
are IV spread and IV skew, respectively, on day t–1 for each firm i. Due to the correlation 
between IV spread and IV skew, we include them in separate regressions. 
 
With the pre-month return and the pre-year return, we take into account the price change 
one year prior to each M&A event. Specifically, pre-month return is the buy-and-hold return 
compounded from day t–22 to t–1, and pre-year return is the buy-and-hold return compounded 
from day t–252 to t–23. We also consider event-related characteristics which may affect 
announcement returns of acquirers. Similar to Cao et al. (2005), we add five event-related 
14 
 
dummies. Successful equals 1 if the merger or acquisition is successfully completed (i.e., the 
status is “C” as indicated in SDC), and zero otherwise.12 Takeover equals 1 if the event is 
classified as an “acquisition of a majority interest” instead of a “merger” in SDC, and zero 
otherwise. Hostile equals 1 if the event’s attitude is identified as “hostile” in SDC, and zero 
otherwise. Rumor equals 1 if “deal began as a rumor” is “yes” in SDC, and zero otherwise. Cash 
equals 1 if the primary payment is cash, that is, the “% of cash” in SDC is greater than or equal 
to 50, and zero otherwise.   
Finally, we control for firm characteristics. Size is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization on the event day. Book value is calculated as book value per share multiplied by 
total shares outstanding, where we use the most recent fiscal year end data prior to each event. 
B/M is the natural logarithm of the ratio of book value to market capitalization. We also include 
year and industry fixed effects. 
Table 4 reports the regression results. In Panel A, the pre-event IV spread has a 
significantly positive association with acquirer announcement CARs. When IV spread is the only 
explanatory variable, it has a positive and significant coefficient of 13.00 with a t-statistic of 3.75. 
In Models 2 to 4, we add controls for previous returns, event-related characteristics, and firm 
characteristics. The predictability of IV spread on acquirer announcement returns is not affected. 
In Model 5 we include all control variables as well as year and industry fixed effects and find 
that the IV spread result still holds, with a coefficient of 13.85 and a t-statistic of 4.03. When the 
                                                          
12
 Whether the event is successfully complete is a forward-looking measure. It may not be 
appropriate to include it when predicting the announcement returns. To address this concern, we 
exclude the “successful” dummy in main regressions, and the results are similar. 
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IV spread increases by one standard deviation, the acquirer announcement CAR increases by 
about 0.70%.  
Panel B of Table 4 reports the impact of IV skew on acquirer announcement returns. In 
Model 1, the IV skew has a coefficient of –9.53 with a t-statistic of –2.59. Adding all control 
variables does not affect the negative relation between IV skew and acquirer CAR (β1 = –9.51, t-
statistic = –2.58). One standard deviation increase of IV skew leads to a decrease of the acquirer 
announcement CAR by about 0.50%. 
[Table 4 about here] 
We argue that when some investors hold positive (negative) information of an upcoming 
M&A event, they will buy more calls (puts). As a result, call (put) options prices will be pushed 
up, and IV spread (IV skew) will be higher. Our regression results suggest that a higher IV 
spread (IV skew) is an indication of positive (negative) information held by options traders. The 
results show that IV spread (IV skew) is positively (negatively) associated with acquirer 
announcement return.
13
 
                                                          
13
 The design of our empirical test is similar to that in Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) and Xing, 
Zhang, and Zhao (2010). They both regress weekly stock returns on IV spread and IV skew to 
examine whether informed options measures have return predictability. Although the average 
weekly return is almost zero (about 0.18%) for firms with options trading in the market, they 
both find a strong positive correlation between IV spread and next-week return and a strong 
negative correlation between IV skew and next-week return. Similarly, we can still examine 
whether options trading have predictability on M&A acquirer announcement returns, even 
16 
 
In addition, we calculate the call and put options return from day –1 to day 0. We 
conjecture that if options traders hold information and can predict event window returns, 
conditional on a positive acquirer announcement return, investors should buy more calls and sell 
more puts on the acquirer’s stock. In this case, we expect that the call return should be positive 
and the put return should be negative. However, conditional on a negative announcement return, 
investors should buy more puts and sell more calls, resulting in a positive return in puts and a 
negative return in calls. Using the bid–ask midpoint on day –1 and day 0, we calculate the call 
return and the put return for each option and take the option delta-weighted average for all calls 
or puts of each event. We then calculate the average call or put return across all events. In 
untabulated results, we show that, conditional on a positive announcement CAR, call (put) 
options have a mean return of 12.77% (–7.34%) and, conditional on a negative CAR, call (put) 
options have a mean return of –9.67% (13.88%). The results hold when we take into account of 
trading costs (i.e. bid-ask spread) or use trading volume as the weight. These findings suggest 
that although the announcement CAR does not change by a large magnitude when informed 
options trading measures change by one standard deviation, investors may still earn a high 
options return if they trade on their private information. 
In sum, our main hypothesis is well supported. We find evidence that options traders do 
hold private information and trade on it before the announcement of an M&A event. IV spread is 
positively associated with the acquirer announcement return, whereas IV skew is negatively 
associated with the acquirer announcement return. In addition predictability remains significant 
when we control for other factors that may affect the event window returns.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
though the literature shows that M&A acquirer announcement returns have a mean close to zero 
(about –0.10%). 
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IV. Additional tests and robustness check 
In this section, we extend our hypothesis testing in four aspects:  the predictability on pseudo-
events, the impact of pre-M&A returns, the role of options liquidity, and the predictability of O/S. 
We then provide evidence using different variations of IV spread and IV skew as robustness 
check. 
 
A. Predictability on pseudo-events 
To determine whether the predictability of our informed options trading measures exists 
only in the information event, i.e. before the announcement of M&A, or even in the normal 
period, we conduct simulations to test the predictability around M&A events as a comparison to 
that in the nonevent period. We carry out simulations using three ways to select pseudo-events. 
First, for each sample acquirer, we randomly choose a non-M&A announcement date and 
pretend that it is the actual M&A announcement date. Second, on each actual M&A 
announcement date, we randomly select a non-acquiring firm from the pool of all firms with 
options trading data. Finally, we pick up a non-announcement date from any non-acquirer and 
treat it as the actual event date. We regress the two-day (t, t+1) CAR on IV spread and IV skew 
at t–1, where t is the pseudo-announcement date, and control for the pre-month return and the 
pre-year return. The process is repeated for 1,000 times. We compute the p-value for IV spread 
(IV skew) regressions as the fraction of the number of trials with the simulated coefficient larger 
(smaller) than the coefficient of the actual M&A sample. Table 5 (rows 2–4) reports the average 
18 
 
coefficient and the associated p-value in simulations. For convenience, we also provide the 
coefficient based on our M&A sample (Model 2 of Table 4) for comparison in row 1. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The regression coefficients for the original M&A sample are three to four times in 
magnitude of those in simulations. The small p-values indicate that there are very few cases in 
which the IV spread or the IV skew has stronger predictability on normal days than on the day 
immediately before the M&A announcements. These results confirm our main finding that pre-
M&A options trading contains private information and that our informed options trading 
measures do predict acquirer announcement returns. This predictability is much stronger around 
the M&A event dates. 
Note that our simulations also suggest that IV spread and IV skew have some 
predictability during the pseudo-event (or non-event) days. This finding is consistent with 
Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) and Xing et al. (2010) who find that IV spread and IV skew 
predict future stock returns in general. By comparing the regression coefficients for pseudo-
events and actual M&As, we not only confirm their findings but also show a much larger 
predictability around the actual M&A announcements.  
 
B. The impact of pre-M&A returns 
This subsection examines the impact of pre-M&A announcement returns. We conjecture that if 
some informed traders also trade on their private information in the stock market or part of the 
M&A information has been leaked out to the stock market before the announcement, the pre-
event stock return will incorporate a certain level of that information. As a result, we expect that 
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the predictive power of IV spread and IV skew on acquirer announcement CAR will be reduced 
by a larger pre-event price change. This conjecture is consistent with the argument in Roll et al. 
(2010) who find a lower predictability of relative trading volume of options to stock when the 
pre-event return is higher. We capture this effect with the interaction terms of our options 
measures and pre-event CARs. The regressions are  
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where CARi,[t–3, t–1] refers to the cumulative abnormal return for acquirer i from day t–3 to t–1, IV 
spread and IV skew are t–1 measures of informed options trading. All control variables are 
defined in equation (3).  
If the M&A announcement delivers good news and the pre-event CAR is high, we expect 
that the positive relation between IV spread and announcement CAR will be smaller because 
some positive information has been incorporated into the share price before the announcement. If 
the pre-event return is low given a favorable M&A event, the net effect of IV spread on acquirer 
announcement CAR should be even stronger. As a result, in equation (4a), β1 is expected to be 
positive while β2 is expected to be negative. 
Similarly, if the M&A event is considered to be bad news and the pre-event CAR is 
negative, we expect that the negative relation between IV skew and acquirer announcement CAR 
will be weaker due to the unfavorable information disseminated before the announcement. Thus 
in equation (4b), we expect both β1 and β2 to be negative.  
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Table 6 reports the results of the pre-event CAR. IV spread has a positive and significant 
prediction on acquirer announcement CARs; the interaction of IV spread and pre-event CAR is 
negative although insignificant (Models 1 to 3). However, IV skew is negatively correlated with 
announcement CAR, and its interaction with pre-event CAR is also negative and significant 
(Models 4 to 6). Overall, when the pre-announcement return has already incorporated part of the 
M&A information, the predictability of our informed options trading measures will be reduced to 
some extent.  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
C. The role of liquidity 
Easley et al. (1998) argue that there will be more informed trading in the options market when 
options are more liquid. As a natural extension of this argument, we examine whether the 
predictability of IV spread and IV skew is affected by the liquidity of options. We expect that 
their predictive power will be strengthened if liquidity in options is higher, and vice versa.  
We measure options liquidity by bid–ask spread. In particular, for each option on each 
day, we calculate the difference between best offer price and best bid price and then divide it by 
the mid-point of the two. This measure serves as a proxy for the cost paid by options traders: the 
higher the bid–ask spread, the lower the options liquidity. We take the average bid–ask spread 
across all non-zero trading volume options for each firm i on each day and then use the average 
from day t–5 to t–1 as a proxy for the acquirer’s options liquidity before the M&A event. We 
then interact options bid–ask spread with each of our informed options trading measures. The 
regressions are  
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where Options Bid–Ask Spread is our options liquidity variable. We use this regression to 
examine the return predictability of IV spread or IV skew under different levels of options 
liquidity. All other variables are the same as in equation (3).  
Table 7 reports the empirical results. Consistent with our expectation, the coefficient on 
IV Spread * Option Bid–Ask Spread is negative (Models 1 to 3), indicating that IV spread has a 
weaker prediction when options liquidity is lower. Similarly, the coefficient on IV Skew * 
Option Bid–Ask Spread is positive and significant (Models 4 to 6). It supports our argument that 
higher options liquidity strengthens the predictive power of IV skew, and vice versa.  
[Table 7 about here] 
Consistent with the findings in Easley et al. (1998) and Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), 
we show that liquidity plays a significant role when investors choose in which market to trade. 
When options liquidity is higher, informed investors may trade more actively in the options 
market to take advantage of high leverage and low cost. As a result, options trading contain more 
information about the M&A events, and our informed options trading measures exhibit stronger 
predictive power on M&A announcement returns.  
 
D. The predictability of O/S 
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For robustness, we consider an alternative informed trading measure, the relative trading volume 
of options to stock (O/S), which is an unsigned volume-based option measure.
14
 Roll et al. (2010) 
show its return predictability in earnings announcement returns. 
If investors hold private information on M&A events, they are likely to trade in both the 
stock market and the options market prior to announcements. Due to the advantage of leverage 
and liquidity of options, options trading volume should increase more than stock trading volume. 
As a result, O/S should increase. When the M&A event generates good (bad) news, investors 
may actively buy (sell) call options or sell (buy) put options. In each case, O/S will be driven up, 
given that we consider trading of both call and put options at the same time. Hence, if investors 
trade in the options market to capitalize on their private information before M&A announcement, 
pre-event O/S should positively predict absolute acquirer CARs. In addition, if a portion of the 
M&A information has been reflected during the pre-event period, the pre-event CAR will have a 
negative impact on positive association between O/S and acquirer announcement CARs. We 
conduct cross-sectional regressions as follows: 
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where the dependent variable is the absolute value of two-day (t, t+1) CAR for acquirer i, and Ln 
(Sh O/S) is the natural logarithm of share volume O/S based on Roll et al. (2010).
15
 In regression 
                                                          
14
 For other volume based measures, also see Spyrou, Tsekrekos, and Siougle (2011). 
15
 For each firm, daily share option volume is calculated as the total contracts traded in each 
option multiplied by 100 (each contract is for 100 shares of stock), then aggregated across all 
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equation (7b), O/S is interacted with the absolute value of acquirer CAR from day t–3 to t–1. All 
controls are defined as in equation (3).  
Table 8 reports the regression results of O/S. The first two models show a positive and 
significant relation between the pre-event O/S and acquirer announcement returns. A higher 
trading volume of options relative to stock before the M&A announcement is associated with a 
larger absolute announcement return of the acquirer. In the last two models, O/S is interacted 
with the absolute CAR during the pre-event three days. The coefficient for this interaction term 
is negative, as reported in Models 3 and 4.  
[Table 8 about here] 
We also compute dollar volume O/S ($ O/S) as the informed trading proxy.
16
 The 
regressions show results similar to using share volume O/S. Besides, we try deciles of Sh O/S 
and deciles of $ O/S, and find that O/S deciles are, in general, positively associated with 
acquirer’s absolute CAR around announcement.17 For brevity, we do not tabulate the results. 
To determine whether our informed options trading measures can predict the occurrence 
of M&A event, for each acquirer we identify one non-event firm matched on size, book-to-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
options traded on that stock. Share volume O/S (Sh O/S) is the ratio of share option volume to 
stock trading volume on that day. 
16
 Dollar options volume is calculated by multiplying the total number of contracts traded in each 
options by the average of best bid and best offer price and then multiplied by 100. Dollar stock 
volume equals stock price multiplied by stock trading volume. Dollar volume O/S ($ O/S) is then 
calculated as the ratio of dollar options volume to dollar stock volume. 
17
 See Johnson and So (2012) for deciles of O/S as informed options trading measure. 
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market ratio, past one-year return, and industry. We use an M&A dummy variable to identify 
whether this firm is an acquirer or a matching firm. We then regress the M&A dummy on our 
informed options trading measures and control variables. Appendix Table 1 shows the logit 
regression results for O/S. The result suggests that the options volume increases before M&A 
event.  
In untabulated results, we also conduct the logit regressions using IV spread and IV skew 
as the informed trading measures. However, we do not find a significant prediction on the 
occurrence of M&A for IV spread and IV skew. One possible explanation is as follows. When 
investors hold positive information about the M&A event, they are likely to buy more call 
options. The increase of IV spread is expected to be positively correlated with the occurrence of 
an M&A event with a positive return. However, if investors hold negative information and buy 
more put options, IV spread will decrease. In this case, a higher IV spread should be negatively 
related with the occurrence of an M&A event with a negative return. Since acquirers have, on 
average, zero announcement return, the positive and negative prediction of IV spread on M&A 
occurrence may cancel out. A similar argument applies to IV skew. As a result, we should only 
find a significant prediction of O/S on an M&A event. 
In addition, if options traders are merely aware of the occurrence of M&A events, we 
should not find a directional prediction of IV spread, IV skew, and O/S on the announcement 
CAR but should only observe an increase in options trading volume before M&A event. The 
buying pressure on call or put options should not necessarily have a positive or negative 
correlation with the occurrence of M&A. Investors’ options trading is likely to predict the 
announcement return only when they possess some information on the M&A event and have an 
expectation on the return.  
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E. Robustness check 
We perform several robustness tests on variations of our options measures. The predictability 
remains significant when we use deciles of IV spread and IV skew and changes in IV spread and 
IV skew over the previous week as well as over the previous month.  
To mitigate the impact of extreme values of our informed options trading measures, we 
adopt deciles instead of the raw value of IV spread and IV skew in regressions. As shown in 
Models 1 and 4 of Table 9, deciles of IV spread and IV skew have consistent and significant 
prediction on acquirer announcement returns. A higher decile of IV spread indicates a higher 
acquirer announcement CAR whereas a higher decile of IV skew indicates a lower acquirer 
announcement CAR. Other variations, such as quintiles and quartiles, generate similar results.  
[Table 9 about here] 
In Models 2 and 5, we adopt changes in IV spread and IV skew over the previous week 
(i.e., the difference between day t–1 and the average from day t–6 to day t–2). Similarly, in 
Models 3 and 6, we adopt changes in IV spread and IV skew over the previous month (i.e., the 
difference between day t–1 and the average from day t–23 to day t–2). Intuitively, a large and 
positive change in IV spread indicates that informed investors are buying increasingly more calls 
than puts as the M&A announcement is approaching. It also indicates that investors may hold 
positive information about the event. Conversely, if IV skew increases gradually before the 
M&A announcement, investors are likely to trade on negative information, and thus they 
purchase more OTM puts than ATM calls. Using changes in IV spread and IV skew provides 
consistent and significant results as shown in Table 4.  
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We also conduct robustness tests by excluding M&A events with deals valued below $10 
million (about 5% of total observations) or below $100 million (about 32% of total observations). 
Predictability remains significant. We also mitigate the effect of small firms by dropping 
acquirers with market capitalization below $400 million (about 10% of total observation), and 
our results still hold.  
In sum, our results indicate that some informed investors trade actively in options market 
prior to announcements in anticipation of the M&A events. Both the signed (IV spread and IV 
skew) and unsigned (O/S) informed options trading measures have significant predictive power 
on acquirer announcement return. Our informed option measures show stronger predictability on 
actual M&A announcement days compared with non-announcement days. In addition, the 
predictability is affected by pre-event price change and the liquidity of options. Our results are 
robust to different alternative constructions of informed options trading measures.  
 
V. Evidence from target firms 
In the previous sections, we show that options trading contains information on M&A acquirer 
CARs. To complete the study, we also analyze a smaller sample of target firms and find some 
supporting evidence for our main hypothesis. We follow the same sample selection procedure as 
that for acquirers and obtain 2,372 M&A observations (1,990 target firms) for January 1996 to 
December 2010. Appendix Table 2 provides the summary statistics. Most target firms have 
positive announcement returns. The mean return is 16.62%, which is much higher than that of 
acquirers. Investors regard the M&A events as good news for target firms and expect positive 
returns after the mergers or acquisitions. As shown in Panel C and Panel D of Appendix Figure 1, 
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target average return increases dramatically immediately before the announcement but remains 
relatively small on normal days. In addition, events with cash-only payment have a higher mean 
return than those with shares payment method. The difference is about 10%. As mentioned in 
Section II, targets have lower liquidity and higher information asymmetry, which is one of the 
reasons why we focus on the acquirers in this paper. 
Appendix Table 3 reports summary statistics of IV spread and IV skew for targets. 
Different from acquirers, targets have a slightly positive mean for IV spread, suggesting that the 
call option is more expensive than the put option for the matching pair. It indicates a higher 
demand for call options due to investors’ expectation that target firms will have positive returns 
in near future.  
To examine the general pattern of target CARs with respect to our informed options 
trading measures, we repeat the analysis in Table 3 by sorting the sample into quintiles based on 
pre-event IV spread and IV skew (Appendix Table 4). Each quintile has a significantly positive 
mean return (and median return) from day t to t+1. The difference between extreme quintiles 
shows a consistent result with the finding in acquirers that target CAR increases with IV spread 
and decreases with IV skew.  
Our hypothesis is that option traders hold private information on M&A events. Target 
announcement return can be positively predicted by IV spread and negatively predicted by IV 
skew. We rerun our main regression in equation (3) using target CAR from day t to t+1 as 
dependent variable and target IV spread and IV skew on day t–1 as independent variables 
separately. All control variables follow the same definitions as before except that we use target 
information for pre-month and pre-year return and firm characteristics. Table 10 shows that IV 
spread has a positive prediction by itself (β1 = 11.56) and with all controls (β1 = 1.93). IV skew 
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has a negative and significant prediction by itself (β1 = –19.53) and with all controls (β1 = –
15.89). The weaker results could be due to lower liquidity of options trading for targets. In 
general, we find some supporting evidence in target firms, which is consistent with Cao et al. 
(2005). 
[Table 10 about here] 
 Although the target firms have much higher announcement returns than the acquirering 
firms, we focus not on the level of CAR but on the correlation between CARs and informed 
options trading measures for testing our informed trading hypothesis. The higher return for 
targets is reflected in the large intercept in Table 10. As a comparison, the intercept for acquirers, 
as shown in Table 4, is much smaller and close to zero. It indicates that even though the level of 
acquirer CAR is small, the correlation between CAR and informed options trading measures can 
still be large and significant, which is reflected by the coefficients on IV spread and IV skew.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
Previous research shows that options trading contains information on future stock returns. Some 
prior studies have examined time-series and cross-sectional predictions of options trading. Others 
employ options measures to examine corporate events, such as earnings announcements and 
stock splits. However, little is known about the informational content of options trading prior to 
M&A events. Our paper, to our knowledge, is the first to investigate the predictability of options 
trading on M&A acquirer announcement return.  
Prior research argues that informed investors tend to capitalize on their private 
information by trading actively to take advantage of the high leverage in options. We thus posit 
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that pre-event options trading contains information on M&A acquirer announcement returns. We 
adopt two newly developed proxies for informed options trading: IV spread as in Cremers and 
Weinbaum (2010) and IV skew as in Xing et al. (2010). A larger IV spread indicates a higher 
demand for calls and a positive expectation on future stock returns. We find that IV spread 
positively predicts M&A acquirer announcement returns. Meanwhile, a larger IV skew is a proxy 
for higher buying pressure on OTM puts relative to ATM calls, indicating that investors are 
expecting a negative return in future. Based on our hypothesis, IV skew should negatively 
predict M&A acquirer announcement return, and the results are consistent with our expectation. 
We further support our main hypothesis by considering the following three aspects. First, 
we show that the IV spread and IV skew have much stronger predictability around actual M&A 
announcement days, compared with pseudo-event days. Second, we find that the predictability of 
informed options trading measures is related to pre-event price changes. If the pre-event return is 
positive (negative), the predictive power of IV spread (skew) will be reduced, and vice versa. 
Third, we find that predictability of options measures is higher if a firm has relatively higher 
option liquidity prior to M&A announcement. If, however, option is less liquid, the predictability 
will be lower.  
In addition, we test a variety of informed trading measures for robustness checks. For 
example, we adopt a volume-based proxy for informed options trading and find that a higher 
relative trading volume of options to stock (i.e., O/S) is associated with a higher absolute 
announcement return for acquirers. If information has been partially incorporated into pre-event 
stock prices, the announcement absolute CAR will be smaller, and the predictive power of O/S 
will decrease. This finding suggests that at least some investors have correctly predicted the 
direction of price changes around M&A announcements. Our main results are also robust using 
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other variations of IV spread and IV skew, such as the decile ranking, change from the previous 
week, and change from the previous month. Finally, we show that our results are not dominated 
by events with small deal values or firms with small market capitalizations. 
In sum, M&A acquirer announcement returns can be predicted by pre-event informed 
options trading measures. The predictive power concentrates around actual announcement dates. 
The result is affected by pre-event stock returns and is strengthened when the options trading is 
more liquid. Our main results hold for a smaller sample of target firms that IV spread and IV 
skew show some predictability on target announcement return.  
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Appendix: Construction of IV spread and IV skew 
A. IV spread  
We employ IV spread documented in Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) as one of our proxies for 
informed options trading activity. To measure deviations from put–call parity, IV spread is 
constructed as the average difference in implied volatilities between call and put options for the 
same security with the same strike price and the same maturity. In particular, we compute IV 
spread for each firm i on each day t as 
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where j refers to pairs of call and put options with the same strike price and the same maturity, 
Ni,t is the total number of valid pairs for each stock i on day t, and
i
tjw ,  is the weight where we 
use the average open interest of call and put in each pair. i
tjIV ,  represents the Black and Scholes 
(1973) implied volatility for each call and put option.  
We exclude those options with zero open interest or zero best bid price. We only keep 
short-term options with time-to-maturity from 10 to 60 days, because an option with its maturity 
longer than two months is less liquid. If investors have private information on M&A events, they 
are more likely to trade on short-term options to realize profit immediately. Short-term options 
are thus expected to reflect more on the information embedded in pre-event options trading. We 
then require option volume to be positive because our aim is to study the information contained 
in pre-event options trading. If there is no trading on the particular option, no information should 
be revealed from the implied volatility. To make the filters consistent between IV spread and IV 
skew, we further restrict stock volume to be positive, stock price to be greater than $5, implied 
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volatility of options to be between 3% and 200%, and option’s average bid and ask price to be 
higher than $0.125.  
 
B. IV skew 
According to Xing et al. (2010), we calculate IV skew for firm i on day t, as the implied 
volatility difference between out-of-the-money (OTM) put and at-the-money (ATM) call, 
ATMcall
ti
OTMput
titi IVIVSkewIV ,,,)2(   
where IVi,t represents the Black and Scholes (1973) implied volatility for OTM put and ATM call 
option. To ensure option liquidity, we also use short-term options with time-to-expiration 
between 10 to 60 days. We require stock volume and option volume to be positive to eliminate 
those nontrading cases. We further restrict stock price to be greater than $5, option open interest 
to be positive, option best bid price to be positive, implied volatility of options to be between 3% 
and 200%, and option’s average bid and ask price to be higher than $0.125.  
We define moneyness as the ratio of strike price to stock price. OTM puts are defined as 
put options with moneyness between 0.80 and 0.95, and ATM calls are defined as call options 
with moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05. If there are multiple OTM puts and ATM calls, we 
select one OTM put with moneyness closest to 0.95 and one ATM call with moneyness closest to 
1. In several occasions, there are put options with the same moneyness which is closest to 0.95. 
We keep the one with the highest open interest, or if open interests are the same, we keep the one 
with the highest stock trading volume. We follow the same selection criteria for ATM calls. In 
this approach, we come up with one skew measure for each firm i on each day t.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Merger and Acquisition Events: Acquirers 
 
This table presents summary statistics for acquirers in merger and acquisition (M&A) events. 
Panel A shows the number of events and acquirers in each year. Panel B shows summary 
statistics on acquirer firm characteristics. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return from day t to 
t+1 where day t is the announcement date. Option bid–ask spread is the pre-M&A five-day 
average bid–ask spread across all options traded on the firm's equity. Analyst coverage equals to 
the number of IBES analyst recommendations in the month before M&A. Size is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization in millions on the day before M&A announcement. Age is the 
number of years that a stock has been covered in CRSP before the M&A announcement. 
Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals from the Fama–French three 
factor model with daily returns in the pre-M&A 12 months. Std represents standard deviation. 
Min represents minimum value, and Max represents maximum value. All variables except CAR 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
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Panel A. M&A Events by Year 
Year Number of M&A Events Number of Firms 
1996 426 301 
1997 533 377 
1998 669 455 
1999 638 440 
2000 652 454 
2001 391 304 
2002 342 284 
2003 344 291 
2004 403 333 
2005 422 354 
2006 453 371 
2007 511 409 
2008 471 367 
2009 362 293 
2010 430 351 
1996–2010 7,047 2,439 
 
Panel B: Characteristics of acquirers 
 Mean Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
CAR (%) –0.10 6.52 –71.46 –2.48 –0.08 2.32 71.39 
Option bid–ask spread 0.25 0.18 0.06 0.15 0.20 0.29 1.19 
Analyst coverage 12.15 8.43 1.00 6.00 10.00 17.00 38.00 
Size 8.14 1.73 4.77 6.85 7.93 9.27 12.34 
Age 20.02 19.72 0.54 5.50 13.05 27.84 81.14 
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Option Measures 
 
This table shows the summary statistics for the two options measures we adopt, i.e. implied 
volatility (IV) spread and implied volatility (IV) skew. The details for each year are presented in 
Panel A and B, with the statistics for the whole sample period in the last row of each panel.  
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Panel A. IV Spread Summary Statistics by Year 
Year No. Obs. MEAN STD MIN Q1 MEDIAN Q3 MAX 
1996 133 0.0010 0.0569 –0.1578 –0.0306 –0.0076 0.0186 0.1933 
1997 164 –0.0110 0.0556 –0.1954 –0.0406 –0.0133 0.0154 0.2500 
1998 220 –0.0169 0.0585 –0.4327 –0.0353 –0.0095 0.0130 0.1207 
1999 270 –0.0102 0.0560 –0.2514 –0.0265 –0.0072 0.0116 0.2534 
2000 329 –0.0208 0.0912 –1.0314 –0.0338 –0.0115 0.0082 0.3468 
2001 172 –0.0128 0.0416 –0.2376 –0.0253 –0.0085 0.0064 0.1191 
2002 120 –0.0087 0.0287 –0.0969 –0.0171 –0.0056 0.0050 0.0922 
2003 140 –0.0034 0.0276 –0.0989 –0.0151 –0.0049 0.0047 0.1493 
2004 166 –0.0052 0.0219 –0.0762 –0.0141 –0.0047 0.0037 0.0833 
2005 175 –0.0105 0.0359 –0.2865 –0.0155 –0.0038 0.0037 0.0726 
2006 219 –0.0045 0.0300 –0.2135 –0.0107 –0.0006 0.0064 0.1616 
2007 283 –0.0082 0.0254 –0.1426 –0.0145 –0.0059 0.0041 0.0842 
2008 265 –0.0046 0.0565 –0.2645 –0.0171 –0.0038 0.0106 0.5431 
2009 207 –0.0099 0.0410 –0.2372 –0.0179 –0.0062 0.0053 0.1618 
2010 213 –0.0036 0.0249 –0.1347 –0.0122 –0.0034 0.0074 0.0992 
1996–
2010 
3,076 –0.0093 0.0505 –1.0314 –0.0207 –0.0058 0.0075 0.5431 
 
Panel B. IV Skew  Summary Statistics by Year 
Year No. Obs. MEAN STD MIN Q1 MEDIAN Q3 MAX 
1996 75 0.0324 0.0612 –0.1154 0.0020 0.0301 0.0533 0.2565 
1997 95 0.0388 0.0552 –0.1497 0.0025 0.0310 0.0687 0.2103 
1998 135 0.0397 0.0540 –0.0937 0.0058 0.0314 0.0680 0.3976 
1999 192 0.0284 0.0471 –0.1484 0.0066 0.0259 0.0490 0.2812 
2000 246 0.0368 0.0897 –0.2006 0.0042 0.0240 0.0533 1.0071 
2001 127 0.0600 0.0554 –0.0520 0.0289 0.0495 0.0770 0.3422 
2002 80 0.0696 0.0516 –0.0081 0.0357 0.0607 0.0858 0.2726 
2003 95 0.0595 0.0354 –0.0180 0.0345 0.0535 0.0760 0.2283 
2004 88 0.0437 0.0285 –0.0139 0.0238 0.0385 0.0562 0.1738 
2005 91 0.0453 0.0330 –0.0221 0.0187 0.0420 0.0595 0.1602 
2006 117 0.0321 0.0330 –0.1264 0.0171 0.0276 0.0419 0.1630 
2007 179 0.0385 0.0302 –0.0331 0.0204 0.0346 0.0535 0.1862 
2008 188 0.0491 0.0502 –0.1483 0.0216 0.0423 0.0630 0.3167 
2009 153 0.0514 0.0430 –0.0813 0.0289 0.0454 0.0643 0.3599 
2010 157 0.0423 0.0278 –0.1035 0.0293 0.0395 0.0530 0.1494 
1996–
2010 
2,018 0.0432 0.0527 –0.2006 0.0184 0.0369 0.0603 1.0071 
 
41 
 
Table 3. Acquirer Announcement Returns Sorted by Implied Volatility Spread and 
Implied Volatility Skew 
 
This table shows the two-day (0,+1) acquirer cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around merger 
and acquisition announcements sorted by quintiles of implied volatility (IV) spread and IV skew 
measured at day t–1. For each quintile, we report mean IV spread, mean CAR (in %) and median 
CAR (in %). In parentheses, we show t-statistics for mean CAR. For median CAR, we conduct 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test and show p-value in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The difference between the highest (quintile 5) and the 
lowest (quintile 1) IV spread or IV skew groups is presented in the last column.  
 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) High–Low 
Sorted by IV Spread 
Mean IV Spread -0.068 -0.017 -0.006 0.004 0.040  
       
Mean CAR –0.82*** –0.22 –0.42* –0.28 0.85*** 1.67*** 
 (–2.74) (–0.90) (–1.82) (–1.37) (3.10) (4.11) 
Median CAR –0.59*** –0.03 –0.13 0.06 0.41*** 1.00*** 
 [0.00] [0.30] [0.18] [0.74] [0.00] [0.00] 
       
Sorted by IV Skew 
Mean IV Skew -0.010 0.022 0.037 0.055 0.111  
       
Mean CAR 0.45 –0.04 –0.24 –0.55** –0.57* –1.02** 
 (1.11) (–0.15) (–1.08) (–2.08) (–1.76) (–1.96) 
Median CAR 0.32 0.17 –0.11 –0.19** –0.46** –0.78*** 
 [0.13] [0.62] [0.30] [0.03] [0.04] [0.01] 
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Table 4. Cross-Sectional Regressions of Acquirer Announcement Returns  
on Implied Volatility Spread and Implied Volatility Skew 
 
This table presents the cross-sectional regressions of acquirer announcement returns on implied 
volatility (IV) spread and IV skew and control variables. The dependent variable is the two-day 
(t, t+1) acquirer cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the M&A announcement date t. The 
CRSP value-weighted market return has been used as the benchmark when calculating the 
abnormal returns. In Panel A, the independent variables include day t–1 IV spread, which is 
calculated based on Cremers and Weinbaum (2010). Panel B uses day t–1 IV skew, which is 
calculated based on Xing et al. (2010). Pre-month return and Pre-year return are buy-and-hold 
returns compounding over pre-event one month and pre-event 2 to 12 months, respectively. 
Successful equals 1 if the merger or acquisition is successfully completed, and zero otherwise. 
Takeover equals 1 if the event is identified as an “acquisition of majority interest” instead of a 
“merger” in SDC, and zero otherwise. Hostile equals 1 if the event is identified as “hostile” in 
SDC, and zero otherwise. Rumor equals 1 if there is a pre-event rumor, and zero otherwise. Cash 
equals 1 if the primary payment is cash, and zero otherwise. Size and book-to-market ratio (B/M) 
are in natural logarithm. CARs are expressed in percentage. We compute t-statistics based on 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A. IV Spread 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
IV Spread 13.00*** 13.14*** 13.41*** 14.06*** 13.85*** 
 (3.75) (3.78) (3.87) (4.10) (4.03) 
Pre-month Return  0.59 0.69 0.59 0.54 
  (0.56) (0.66) (0.55) (0.50) 
Pre-year Return  0.05 0.08 0.01 –0.01 
  (0.36) (0.59) (0.07) (–0.10) 
Successful   0.14 0.12 0.15 
   (0.48) (0.41) (0.54) 
Takeover   1.07*** 1.22*** 1.24*** 
   (4.42) (5.11) (5.14) 
Hostile   –1.91* –1.82* –1.64 
   (–1.76) (–1.68) (–1.52) 
Rumor   0.31 0.71** 0.64* 
   (0.88) (2.04) (1.79) 
Cash   0.45* 0.53** 0.50** 
   (1.90) (2.30) (2.15) 
Size    –0.26*** –0.26*** 
    (–3.46) (–3.30) 
B/M    –0.20 –0.19 
    (–1.64) (–1.45) 
Year & Industry Control     Yes 
Intercept –0.06 –0.09 –0.55* 1.53** 2.33 
 (–0.48) (–0.77) (–1.83) (2.05) (0.97) 
N 3,076 3,076 3,076 3,076 3,076 
Adj. R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Table 4 continues  
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel B. IV Skew 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
IV Skew –9.53*** –9.86*** –9.72*** –9.76*** –9.51*** 
 (–2.59) (–2.71) (–2.68) (–2.69) (–2.58) 
Pre-month Return  0.58 0.68 0.37 0.47 
  (0.45) (0.52) (0.28) (0.36) 
Pre-year Return  –0.13 –0.09 –0.21 –0.20 
  (–0.75) (–0.53) (–1.16) (–1.05) 
Successful   0.10 0.05 0.11 
   (0.28) (0.14) (0.30) 
Takeover   0.95*** 1.11*** 1.16*** 
   (3.22) (3.79) (3.87) 
Hostile   –3.14** –3.06** –3.09** 
   (–2.22) (–2.17) (–2.18) 
Rumor   0.27 0.56 0.51 
   (0.66) (1.42) (1.25) 
Cash   0.23 0.29 0.27 
   (0.78) (0.99) (0.91) 
Size    –0.21** –0.22** 
    (–1.99) (–1.96) 
B/M    –0.28* –0.33* 
    (–1.82) (–1.91) 
Year & Industry Control     Yes 
Intercept 0.22 0.29 –0.05 1.57 2.46 
 (1.01) (1.29) (–0.12) (1.40) (0.70) 
N 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 
Adj. R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Table 5. Regressions of Pseudo-Merger and Acquisition Events 
 
This table shows the coefficients of implied volatility (IV) spread and IV skew in regressions of 
acquirer announcement returns based on simulations. For easy comparisons with simulation 
results, the first row shows the coefficients based on our original M&A sample, controlling for 
the pre-month return and the pre-year return (i.e., Model 2 in Table 4). In the second row, for 
each acquirer in our sample, we randomly choose a non-announcement date as its pseudo-
announcement date. In the third row, on each M&A announcement date in our sample, we 
randomly choose a non-acquiring firm, as a pseudo-acquirer, from the pool of all firms with 
options trading. In the last row, we randomly choose a non-acquirer on a non-announcement date 
from the pool of all optioned firms on all days during the sample period, as a pseudo acquirer on 
a pseudo-announcement date. We regress the two-day (t, t+1) CAR on IV spread and IV skew 
measured at t–1, where t is the pseudo-announcement date, controlling for the pre-month return 
and the pre-year return. The process is repeated for 1,000 times. The table (rows 2–4) shows the 
average coefficient of pseudo-events in simulations. The significance is measured by the p-value 
reported in bracket, defined as the number of trials with the simulated coefficient of IV spread 
(IV skew) larger (smaller) than the actual M&A sample coefficient, then divided by 1,000. 
   
 IV Spread IV Skew 
Original sample for acquirers on actual 
announcement dates 
13.14 –9.86 
   
Acquirers on non-announcement dates 4.45 
[0.003] 
–2.32 
[0.003] 
   
Non-acquirers on actual announcement dates 3.91 
[0.003] 
–2.49 
[0.008] 
   
Non-acquirers on non-announcement dates 3.34 
[0.000] 
–1.85 
[0.001] 
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Table 6. The Impact of Pre-Merger and Acquisition Returns 
 
This table shows the cross-sectional regressions of two-day (t, t+1) acquirer cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) around merger and acquisition announcements on day t–1 of implied 
volatility (IV) spread and IV skew, and their interactions with pre-announcement return. CAR i, [t-
3, t-1] measures the cumulative abnormal return from day t–3 to t–1. All other control variables are 
the same as in Table 4. Models 1 to 3 report results for IV spread and Models 4 to 6 are for IV 
skew. CARs are expressed in percentage. We compute t-statistics based on White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. ***, *, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
IV Spread 13.13*** 14.17*** 13.96***    
 (3.70) (4.03) (3.96)    
IV Spread*CAR i, [t-3, t-1] –0.10 –0.09 –0.10    
 (–0.33) (–0.31) (–0.32)    
IV Skew    –8.50** –8.47** –8.25** 
    (–2.23) (–2.25) (–2.15) 
IV Skew*CAR i, [t-3, t-1]    –0.44 –0.53* –0.50* 
    (–1.60) (–1.81) (–1.70) 
Pre-month Return  0. 57 0.52  0.60 0.69 
  (0.54) (0.49)  (0.46) (0.52) 
Pre-year Return  0.01 –0.02  –0.20 –0.19 
  (0.05) (–0.11)  (–1.07) (–1.00) 
Successful  0.12 0.16  0.05 0.11 
  (0.41) (0.54)  (0.16) (0.31) 
Takeover  1.22*** 1.24***  1.14*** 1.19*** 
  (5.12) (5.14)  (3.89) (3.96) 
Hostile  –1.82* –1.64  –3.12** –3.15** 
  (–1.68) (–1.52)  (–2.20) (–2.22) 
Rumor  0.71** 0.63*  0.59 0.54 
  (2.04) (1.78)  (1.49) (1.33) 
Cash  0.53** 0.50**  0.27 0.26 
  (2.30) (2.14)  (0.92) (0.86) 
Size  –0.26*** –0.26***  –0.22** –0.23** 
  (–3.45) (–3.30)  (–2.11) (–2.07) 
B/M  –0.20* –0.19  –0.28* –0.32* 
  (–1.67) (–1.49)  (–1.81) (–1.86) 
Year & Industry Control   Yes   Yes 
Intercept –0.06 1.52** 2.33 0.20 1.64 2.51 
 (–0.51) (2.03) (0.97) (0.89) (1.46) (0.72) 
N 3,076 3,076 3,076 2,018 2,018 2,018 
Adj. R
2
 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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Table 7. The Role of Options Liquidity 
 
This table presents the cross-sectional regressions of two-day (t, t+1) acquirer cumulative 
abnormal return (CARs) around merger and acquisition announcements on day t–1 of implied 
volatility (IV) spread and IV skew, and their interactions with options liquidity measure. We use 
the bid–ask spread (best offer minus best bid, divided by the average of the two) to measure the 
liquidity of an option. For each day, we calculate the options bid–ask spread for all non-zero 
trading options and then take the average of pre-event five days. All control variables are the 
same as in Table 4. Models 1 to 3 are for IV spread and Models 4 to 6 are for IV skew. CARs are 
expressed in percentage. We compute t-statistics (in parentheses) based on White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
IV Spread 16.41** 18.28*** 18.31***    
 (2.37) (2.63) (2.61)    
IV Spread*Options  –15.66 –19.29 –20.35    
Bid–Ask Spread (–0.57) (–0.69) (–0.73)    
IV Skew     –
23.92*** 
–
23.59*** 
–
23.98*** 
    (–3.62) (–3.66) (–3.66) 
IV Skew*Options     66.90** 66.29** 69.51** 
Bid-Ask Spread    (2.20) (2.25) (2.33) 
Options Bid–Ask Spread  0.94 –0.18 –0.22 0.39 –0.29 –1.33 
 (0.73) (–0.13) (–0.16) (0.15) (–0.11) (–0.49) 
Pre-month Return  0.58 0.52  0.44 0.49 
  (0.53) (0.49)  (0.33) (0.37) 
Pre-year Return  0.01 –0.01  –0.20 –0.20 
  (0.08) (–0.09)  (–1.09) (–1.02) 
Successful  0.11 0.15  –0.00 0.05 
  (0.39) (0.51)  (–0.00) (0.14) 
Takeover  1.23*** 1.25***  1.09*** 1.15*** 
  (5.12) (5.16)  (3.71) (3.86) 
Hostile  –1.83* –1.65  –3.04** –3.06** 
  (–1.69) (–1.53)  (–2.16) (–2.18) 
Rumor  0.71** 0.63*  0.50 0.47 
  (2.04) (1.78)  (1.28) (1.17) 
Cash  0.53** 0.51**  0.29 0.28 
  (2.31) (2.17)  (1.01) (0.93) 
Size  –0.26*** –0.26***  –0.17 –0.18 
  (–3.32) (–3.14)  (–1.56) (–1.59) 
B/M  –0.20* –0.19  –0.31** –0.33* 
  (–1.65) (–1.45)  (–1.98) (–1.92) 
Year & Industry control   Yes   Yes 
Intercept –0.23 1.59* 2.43 0.24 1.29 2.40 
 (–0.85) (1.75) (0.98) (0.49) (0.96) (0.66) 
N 3,076 3,076 3,076 2,018 2,018 2,018 
Adj. R
2
 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
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Table 8. Cross-Sectional Regressions of Acquirer Announcement Returns on Options to 
Stock Volume Ratio 
 
This table shows cross-sectional regressions of absolute value of two-day (t, t+1) acquirer 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around merger and acquisition announcements on day t–1 of 
option to stock volume ratio (O/S) and control variables. We construct share volume O/S (Sh 
O/S) according to Roll et al. (2010). Daily share option volume is calculated as the total contracts 
traded in each option multiplied by 100 (as each contract is for 100 shares of stock) and then 
aggregated across all options traded on that stock. Sh O/S equals share option volume divided by 
stock trading volume on that day. Natural logarithm of Sh O/S is used in the following 
regressions. In regression (3) to (4), Ln (Sh O/S) is interacted with absolute CAR for pre-event 
three days. All other control variables are the same as in Table 4. Both the announcement CAR 
and the pre-event CAR are expressed in percentage. We compute t-statistics (in parentheses) 
based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Model 1 2 3 4 
Ln (Sh O/S) 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 
 (4.31) (4.07) (6.62) (5.75) 
Ln (Sh O/S)*   –0.05*** –0.03*** 
Absolute CAR i, [t-3, t-1]   (–5.89) (–4.34) 
Pre-month Return –1.50* –1.40* –1.25* –1.23* 
 (–1.89) (–1.81) (–1.65) (–1.65) 
Pre-year Return 0.31*** 0.22* 0.29** 0.21* 
 (2.61) (1.91) (2.49) (1.87) 
Successful 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.24) (0.21) (0.37) 
Takeover –0.84*** –0.82*** –0.84*** –0.83*** 
 (–5.83) (–5.77) (–5.96) (–5.88) 
Hostile 1.03* 1.01* 1.03* 1.02* 
 (1.90) (1.81) (1.90) (1.85) 
Rumor 0.21 0.32 0.20 0.28 
 (0.93) (1.39) (0.89) (1.23) 
Cash –0.39*** –0.27** –0.29** –0.24* 
 (–2.88) (–2.00) (–2.20) (–1.77) 
Size –0.77*** –0.76*** –0.68*** –0.69*** 
 (–18.44) (–17.45) (–15.98) (–15.87) 
B/M –0.53*** –0.38*** –0.46*** –0.35*** 
 (–6.81) (–4.74) (–5.94) (–4.43) 
Year & Industry Control  Yes  Yes 
Intercept 10.60*** 11.07*** 9.66*** 10.67*** 
 (23.61) (9.22) (21.39) (9.04) 
N 5,179 5,179 5,179 5,179 
Adj. R
2
 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.14 
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Table 9. Robustness Check on Alternative Measures for Implied Volatility Spread and 
Implied Volatility Skew 
 
This table shows the regressions of two-day (t, t+1) acquirer cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
around merger and acquisition announcements on alternative measures of implied volatility (IV) 
spread and IV skew. In column (1) and (4), we use deciles of IV spread and IV skew as 
independent variables. In column (2) and (5), Change in IV spread (or IV skew)_W represents 
the difference between IV spread (IV skew) on day t–1 and the average of previous week (i.e., 
day t–6 to day t–2. In column (3) and (6), Change in IV spread (or IV skew)_M represents the 
difference between  IV spread (IV skew) on day t–1 and the average of previous month (i.e., day 
t–23 to day t–2. All control variables follow the same definitions as in Table 4. CARs are in 
percentage. We compute t-statistics (in parentheses) based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
IV Spread Deciles 0.18***      
 (4.04)      
Change in IV Spread_W  18.67***     
  (4.90)     
Change in IV Spread_M   18.18***    
   (5.35)    
IV Skew Deciles    –0.14**   
    (–2.38)   
Change in IV Skew_W     –
12.22*** 
 
     (–3.17)  
Change in IV Skew_M      –
15.22***       (–3.75) 
Pre-month Return 0.41 0.76 0.34 0.57 0.44 0.52 
 (0.38) (0.72) (0.32) (0.44) (0.32) (0.39) 
Pre-year Return –0.01 –0.06 –0.03 –0.20 –0.16 –0.17 
 (–0.06) (–0.52) (–0.19) (–1.03) (–0.82) (–0.90) 
Successful 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.12 –0.04 0.00 
 (0.41) (0.16) (0.49) (0.34) (–0.11) (0.01) 
Takeover 1.22*** 1.16*** 1.14*** 1.18*** 1.11*** 1.12*** 
 (5.00) (4.75) (4.74) (3.94) (3.71) (3.72) 
Hostile –1.65 –1.55 –1.66 –3.18** –3.16** –2.97** 
 (–1.52) (–1.40) (–1.54) (–2.27) (–2.02) (–2.06) 
Rumor 0.63* 0.53 0.61* 0.51 0.45 0.50 
 (1.79) (1.51) (1.75) (1.26) (1.11) (1.26) 
Cash 0.52** 0.46* 0.47** 0.26 0.26 0.27 
 (2.24) (1.93) (2.01) (0.88) (0.82) (0.91) 
Size –
0.25*** 
–0.18** –0.22*** –0.20* –0.19 –0.18 
 (–3.17) (–2.23) (–2.79) (–1.80) (–1.61) (–1.64) 
B/M –0.24* –0.26** –0.20 –0.38** –0.31* –0.30* 
 (–1.83) (–1.97) (–1.54) (–2.13) (–1.68) (–1.71) 
Year & Industry Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.95 1.47 1.86 2.30 1.63 1.43 
 (0.40) (0.65) (0.83) (0.65) (0.49) (0.43) 
N 3,076 2,937 3,052 2,018 1,891 1,974 
Adj. R
2
 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 
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Table 10. Cross-Sectional Regressions of Target Announcement Return on 
Implied Volatility Spread and Implied Volatility Skew 
 
This table presents the cross-sectional regressions of two-day (t, t+1) target cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) around merger and acquisition announcements on day t–1 of implied volatility (IV) 
spread and IV skew, with control variables. We rerun all regressions in Table 4, using data for 
target firms. Panel A contains regressions on IV spread, and Panel B contains regressions on IV 
skew. CARs are in percentage. We compute t-statistics (in parentheses) based on White's (1980) 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A. IV Spread 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
IV Spread 11.56 9.20 1.34 3.18 1.93 
 (0.98) (0.81) (0.13) (0.33) (0.20) 
Pre-month Return  –8.37* –12.61*** –16.17*** –18.25*** 
  (–1.93) (–3.04) (–4.09) (–4.48) 
Pre-year Return  –0.71 –0.76 –2.43*** –2.31*** 
  (–0.99) (–1.17) (–3.84) (–3.68) 
Successful   4.14*** 3.74*** 3.63*** 
   (3.12) (2.87) (2.58) 
Takeover   –18.10*** –16.33*** –15.77*** 
   (–3.63) (–3.77) (–3.91) 
Hostile   7.92** 10.52*** 8.78*** 
   (2.57) (3.79) (3.08) 
Rumor   –8.01*** –7.01*** –7.59*** 
   (–6.74) (–5.85) (–5.81) 
Cash   10.66*** 10.68*** 12.07*** 
   (7.60) (7.70) (7.74) 
Size    –0.69 –0.19 
    (–1.61) (–0.40) 
B/M    –4.15*** –3.77*** 
    (–4.82) (–4.51) 
Year & Industry Control     Yes 
Intercept 12.73*** 13.71*** 9.96*** 10.60*** 6.81 
 (19.64) (15.03) (8.52) (2.67) (1.38) 
N 808 805 805 803 803 
Adj. R
2
 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.23 0.24 
Table 10 continues 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
Panel B. IV Skew 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
IV Skew –19.53** –18.27** –17.57** –13.97* –15.89** 
 (–2.43) (–2.19) (–2.34) (–1.83) (–2.03) 
Pre-month Return  –10.65** –14.30*** –17.78*** –19.92*** 
  (–2.40) (–3.47) (–4.36) (–4.46) 
Pre-year Return  –0.17 –0.21 –1.02** –1.20** 
  (–0.31) (–0.43) (–2.04) (–2.29) 
Successful   3.92*** 3.04** 2.61* 
   (2.76) (2.12) (1.74) 
Takeover   –12.45* –11.07 –12.69* 
   (–1.66) (–1.57) (–1.65) 
Hostile   6.37* 8.86** 6.46* 
   (1.70) (2.54) (1.79) 
Rumor   –7.24*** –6.32*** –6.80*** 
   (–5.56) (–4.73) (–4.66) 
Cash   9.14*** 9.41*** 10.48*** 
   (6.10) (6.53) (6.34) 
Size    –0.96* –0.93* 
    (–1.87) (–1.76) 
B/M    –3.05*** –3.13*** 
    (–4.23) (–4.43) 
Year & Industry Control     Yes 
Intercept 11.95*** 13.29*** 10.33*** 14.51*** 18.81*** 
 (15.42) (13.44) (7.85) (3.12) (3.63) 
N 460 459 459 458 458 
Adj. R
2
 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.27 0.31 
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Appendix Table 1. The Prediction of Option to Stock Volume Ratio on the Occurrence of 
Merger and Acquisition Event 
 
This table shows the logit regressions of M&A event dummy on day t-1 option to stock volume 
ratio (O/S). and other control variables. O/S is defined as in Table 8. For each acquirer, we select 
one firm without merger and acquisition (M&A) announcement on day t as a matching firm, and 
match on previous fiscal year end size and book-to-market ratio (B/M), past one-year return, as 
well as industry. M&A event dummy equals 1 if the firm is an acquirer, and 0 if the firm is a 
matching firm. All other control variables are the same as in Table 4. t-statistics are calculated 
using White's (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, and ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
     
Model 1 2 3 4 
Ln (Sh O/S) 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 
 (6.27) (5.89) (5.28) (5.27) 
Pre-month Return  0.28* 0.33** 0.34** 
  (1.90) (2.25) (2.30) 
Pre-year Return  0.04* 0.10*** 0.11*** 
  (1.94) (3.82) (3.98) 
Size   0.09*** 0.12*** 
   (6.66) (7.87) 
B/M   0.15*** 0.20*** 
   (4.79) (5.58) 
Year & Industry Control    Yes 
Intercept 0.63*** 0.59*** –0.02 0.30 
 (10.88) (9.89) (–0.11) (0.58) 
N 8,437 8,437 8,430 8,430 
Pseudo R
2
 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.014 
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Appendix Table 2. Summary Statistics for Merger and Acquisition Events: Targets 
 
This table presents summary statistics for targets in merger and acquisition (M&A) events. Panel 
A shows the number of events and the number of targets in each year. Panel B shows summary 
statistics on target firm characteristics. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return from day t to t+1 
where day t is the announcement date. Option bid–ask spread is the pre-M&A five-day average 
bid–ask spread across all options traded on the firm's equity. Analyst coverage equals to the 
number of IBES analyst recommendations in the month before M&A. Size is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization in millions on the day before M&A announcement. Age is the 
number of years that a stock has been covered in CRSP before the M&A announcement. 
Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the residuals from the Fama–French three-
factor model with daily returns in the pre-M&A 12 months. Std represents standard deviation. 
Min represents minimum value, and Max represents maximum value. All variables except CAR 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
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Panel A. M&A Events by Year 
Year Number of M&A Events Number of Firms 
1996 113 106 
1997 147 129 
1998 206 199 
1999 245 224 
2000 223 209 
2001 139 130 
2002 69 66 
2003 97 86 
2004 107 102 
2005 146 135 
2006 197 180 
2007 232 211 
2008 151 136 
2009 136 128 
2010 164 149 
1996–2010 2,372 1,990 
 
Panel B:  Characteristics of targets 
 Mean Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
CAR (%) 16.62 24.56 –91.33 3.04 12.32 25.37 315.31 
Option bid-ask spread 0.31 0.23 0.06 0.17 0.25 0.37 1.43 
Analyst coverage 9.86 6.79 1.00 5.00 8.00 13.00 33.00 
Size 7.03 1.47 3.92 5.99 6.96 7.93 10.73 
Age 15.65 16.22 0.83 4.28 10.33 21.40 76.61 
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09 
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Appendix Table 3. Summary Statistics for Options Measures: Targets 
 
This table shows summary statistics for the two options measures of target firms, i.e. implied 
volatility (IV) spread and IV skew. The details for each year are presented in Panel A and B, 
with the statistics for the whole sample period in the last row of each panel.  
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Panel A. IV Spread Summary Statistics by Year 
Year No. obs. MEAN STD MIN Q1 MEDIAN Q3 MAX 
1996 45 0.0109 0.0935 –0.2690 –0.0231 0.0206 0.0701 0.1845 
1997 51 0.0360 0.1060 –0.2070 –0.0250 0.0040 0.0794 0.3987 
1998 79 0.0008 0.1154 –0.6427 –0.0265 0.0022 0.0457 0.3961 
1999 96 0.0302 0.1018 –0.2058 –0.0284 0.0173 0.0890 0.3051 
2000 80 0.0167 0.0813 –0.1883 –0.0212 0.0010 0.0473 0.3960 
2001 24 –0.0127 0.0840 –0.2318 –0.0529 –0.0030 0.0450 0.1331 
2002 12 –0.0149 0.0650 –0.1254 –0.0558 –0.0145 0.0132 0.1210 
2003 24 0.0006 0.0430 –0.0489 –0.0227 –0.0069 0.0052 0.1497 
2004 33 0.0086 0.0290 –0.0525 –0.0040 0.0022 0.0200 0.1106 
2005 48 –0.0065 0.0327 –0.1016 –0.0076 0.0027 0.0091 0.0681 
2006 63 –0.0047 0.0270 –0.1168 –0.0147 –0.0068 0.0083 0.0752 
2007 95 –0.0068 0.0293 –0.1335 –0.0189 –0.0035 0.0088 0.0778 
2008 44 –0.0061 0.0697 –0.1996 –0.0368 –0.0030 0.0192 0.1515 
2009 47 –0.0099 0.0330 –0.1405 –0.0211 –0.0086 0.0136 0.0494 
2010 67 –0.0093 0.0519 –0.2883 –0.0194 –0.0070 0.0065 0.1312 
1996–2010 808 0.0047 0.0753 –0.6427 –0.0215 –0.0018 0.0241 0.3987 
 
Panel B. IV Skew  Summary Statistics by Year 
Year No. obs. MEAN STD MIN Q1 MEDIAN Q3 MAX 
1996 23 0.0043 0.0532 –0.094 –0.0365 –0.0001 0.0401 0.1517 
1997 25 0.0185 0.1009 –0.2571 –0.0075 0.0150 0.0778 0.1965 
1998 45 0.0182 0.0933 –0.2745 –0.0161 0.0193 0.0704 0.3042 
1999 62 0.0209 0.0930 –0.1947 –0.032 0.0234 0.0793 0.2300 
2000 51 0.0390 0.1092 –0.3136 –0.0019 0.0304 0.0735 0.4952 
2001 11 0.0631 0.1038 –0.0386 –0.0166 0.0340 0.1505 0.2881 
2002 3 0.0354 0.0080 0.0263 0.0263 0.0386 0.0412 0.0412 
2003 15 0.0495 0.0255 0.0108 0.0291 0.0487 0.0681 0.0976 
2004 14 0.0109 0.0591 –0.1387 –0.0015 0.0289 0.0455 0.0785 
2005 24 0.0542 0.0721 –0.0348 0.0172 0.0339 0.0679 0.2777 
2006 31 0.0434 0.0374 –0.0289 0.0173 0.0374 0.0608 0.1657 
2007 55 0.0409 0.0573 –0.0967 0.0038 0.0315 0.0686 0.2104 
2008 27 0.0533 0.0998 –0.2163 0.0083 0.0522 0.1260 0.2037 
2009 27 0.0572 0.0639 –0.0822 0.0206 0.0432 0.1162 0.1699 
2010 47 0.0569 0.0484 0.0016 0.0250 0.0423 0.0795 0.2259 
1996–2010 460 0.0368 0.0797 –0.3136 0.0032 0.0338 0.0691 0.4952 
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Appendix Table 4. Target Announcement Returns Sorted by Implied Volatility Spread and 
Implied Volatility Skew 
 
This table shows the two-day (0,+1) target cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around merger 
and acquisition announcements sorted by quintiles of implied volatility (IV) spread and IV skew 
measured at day t–1. For each quintile, we report mean IV spread, mean CAR (in %) and median 
CAR (in %). In parentheses, we show t-statistics for mean CAR. For median CAR, we conduct 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test and show p-value in brackets. The difference between the highest 
(Quintile 5) and the lowest (Quintile 1) IV spread or IV skew group is also computed in the last 
column. 
 
 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) High–Low 
Sorted by IV Spread 
Mean IV Spread -0.081 -0.017 -0.002 0.018 0.105  
       
Mean CAR 11.28*** 11.06*** 13.49*** 12.67*** 15.44*** 4.16 
 (6.78) (9.49) (11.01) (10.80) (8.02) (1.64) 
Median CAR 6.76*** 6.02*** 10.64*** 10.40*** 13.12*** 6.37** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] 
       
Sorted by IV Skew 
Mean IV Skew -0.065 0.009 0.033 0.061 0.146  
       
Mean CAR 12.39*** 9.89*** 14.92*** 11.60*** 7.35*** -5.04** 
   (8.14)  (7.02)  (8.01)  (7.30)  (5.38) (-2.47) 
Median CAR 10.55*** 7.65*** 10.84*** 7.31*** 3.77*** -6.79*** 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
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Appendix Figure 1. Average Abnormal Returns Relative to Merger and Acquisition 
Announcement Dates 
 
The panels show the daily average abnormal returns for acquirers and targets during day t–30 to 
day t+30, where t is the announcement date of merger and acquisition event. Panel A and B are 
for acquirers, and Panel C and D are for targets. Abnormal return is calculated as the daily return 
subtracted by market value-weighted return. Solid line shows the equal-weighted or value-
weighted average returns across all events on each trading day. The 95% confidence interval is 
plotted in dashed line.   
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